Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications
2003

The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances
George W. Dent

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Repository Citation
Dent, George W., "The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances" (2003). Faculty Publications. 249.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/249

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

THE GEORGE A. LEET BUSINESS
LAW SYMPOSIUM:
THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
INTRODUCTION
The rapid proliferation of strategic alliances - such as joint
ventures, dealerships, franchises, and licenses - is transforming the
way the world does business. Alliances have become indispensable in many industries due to globalization and to the acceleration
of technological change. To flourish in these industries a firm
must access foreign markets and develop new technologies quicker
than it is capable of on its own; it must gain the resources of another firm through a business alliance. Those resources may be
financial or in the form of expertise, as in technology or marketing.
The growth of alliances is also spurred by two new forces that
pose a dilemma for firms. One is pressure to concentrate on a
firm's core competencies and shed activities where competitors
have greater expertise. We have learned that conglomeration is
bad and focus is good. The other trend is to insist that firms not
stand pat but constantly seek new sources of profit. To satisfy
these seemingly incompatible demands, firms often try to maintain
their focus while expanding their activities by partnering with
firms that have complementary strengths. In the past, suppliers
and customers dealt through ordinary contracts, but alliances better
allow firms to speed innovation while maintaining flexibility to
adapt to rapidly fluctuating market conditions.
Alliances are also transforming the work of business lawyers.
In alliances the parties must trust and cooperate with each other
much more than in the financings and acquisitions that are the traditional staples of corporate practice. As a consequence, in negotiating and drafting contracts for alliances lawyers must not only
master a new set of substantive terms but assume a new demeanor,
one that fosters such trust and cooperation.
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Unfortunately, legal academia has almost completely ignored
this trend. Finance and business authors have generated reams of
books and articles poring over the theoretical and practical issues
of alliances, but in law the literature comprises little more than the
proceedings of a few continuing legal education programs. The
probable reasons for this oversight are illuminating. Traditionally,
firms acquire goods and services in one of two ways: they either
"make" them within the firm or "buy" them in market purchase
contracts. In legal academia, the former is covered in business
associations; the latter, in contracts. Strategic alliances do not fit
into either established category and seem to be falling between the
cracks.
George A. Leet endowed the Business Law Symposium to
tackle new issues and to cultivate imaginative analyses and solutions; therefore, this Symposium marks the first serious effort by
legal academia to study strategic alliances. Since alliances differ
from other business transactions fundamentally and not merely in
technical details, any serious examination of alliances must incorporate several perspectives. One of these is a traditional legal
analysis of the consequences of choosing a particular form of
business organization (such as the joint venture) and of various
contract terms. Another is a corporate finance analysis that investigates how alliances allocate property rights and address agency
costs so as to maximize the parties' profit. Both these approaches
rely on insights from psychology and sociology regarding how
trust and cooperation are created and maintained so as to minimize
risk to both parties.
To this spectrum of disciplinary perspectives must be added
another set of perspectives, those of the various players in the
game. First there are the parties, whose interests vary depending
on their financial resources, the significance of the particular alliance within the firm, the inputs that they offer to the alliance, and
the benefits that they hope to reap from it. Then there are the lawyers, who may be outside or in-house counsel. Finally, there are
investment bankers, accountants, and others who advise the parties
or facilitate the transaction.
The speakers for this Symposium bring a wealth of experience
and represent a wide variety of these perspectives. Our first principal speaker, Stephen Fraidin, is a distinguished corporate lawyer
who has also taught in law schools and written extensively about
business transactions. 1 His article focuses on the control issues in
1
See Stephen Fraidin & Radu Lelutiu, Strategic Alliances and C01porate Control, 53
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 865 (2003).
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strategic alliances, especially where one partner in the alliance
makes an equity investment in the other. In some cases this investment is complemented by a right of the investing company to
acquire its partner. Alternatively, the investing company may
make a takeover bid for its partner. What contract terms are desirable to cover these possibilities? And what are the fiduciary duties
of the investing company to its partner?
The first commentator on Fraidin' s article is another distinguished corporate lawyer and an alumna of our law school, Jeanne
Rickert, who explores three issues in strategic alliances. 2 First,
trust and cooperation in an alliance depend heavily on what will
happen when the alliance terminates. The lawyers must help the
parties in negotiating the alliance to focus on that issue which, in
their desire to think positively and avoid conflict, they might prefer to ignore. Second, there is an inherent conflict of interest when
an officer, who owes allegiance to the partner who is her employer, also participates in the governance of the alliance, where
she owes duties to both partners. She notes that courts have not
resolved this conflict, so it behooves the parties to work it out by
contract. Third, non-competition clauses between partners can
raise sticky problems when one partner is acquired by a company
that competes with the other partner.
The second commentator on the morning panel is Dan Austin,
a prominent investment banker in mergers, acquisitions, and alliances.3 He notes the potential problems when partners have different goals, like creating jobs on one side and maximizing profits
on the other. Next he discusses how detailed alliance agreements
should be arranged. Partners want to maintain flexibility to meet
unexpected circumstances and to avoid haggling over contingencies that could undermine trust and cooperation, but a thoughtful,
thorough set of rules can enhance trust and cooperation.
Following the comments was a lively colloquy among the
panelists and the large audience, which included several experienced participants in business alliances. Among the issues discussed were the need for lengthier negotiations than in other deals
because the parties have to reach mutually acceptable terms; the
difficult role of lawyers and the need for business people to talk
without lawyers present; the desirability of arbitration and other

2
See Jeanne M. Rickert, Keep Your Eyes Open: Avoiding Unillfended Consequences in
Joim Vellture Relationships, 53 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 897 (2003).
3
See Daniel F. Austin, A Businesspersons' Perspective Concerning Joint Ventures, 53
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (2003).
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dispute resolution clauses; and the possible benefits of outside advisors.
The main speaker on the first afternoon program was Rachelle
Sampson, a finance and management scholar who also holds a law
degree. 4 She begins by noting that an alliance can entail either
profit-sharing, perhaps through a separate entity (like a joint venture partnership or corporation), or a contract with stipulated consideration instead of profit-sharing. She then asks under what circumstances either of these is preferable to the other. One approach
by scholars to this issue focuses on the allocation of property
rights to induce the most efficient investments by the partners.
Another approach - transaction cost economics - focuses on protecting a partner who has made an investment from holdup by the
other party, who may refuse to cooperate after the investment has
been made.
In theory, an equity (or profit-sharing) alliance (like a joint
venture) is more suited for complex arrangements, where it is difficult to specify the rights and duties of the parties in advance, in
order to monitor the partners' compliance and to enforce the contract by proving a breach if one occurs. Equity joint ventures are
not always optimal, though. They are often too costly to set up
and operate in simpler transactions where a traditional contract
will suffice. Another determinant of alliance structure is whether
there are prior dealings between the parties or a social network
within an industry that reduce moral hazard problems so that
costly formal structures are not needed.
Professor Sampson measures this theory against her empirical
study of alliances. She gauged the complexity of a number of equity and non-equity alliances and then ascertained how many patents each alliance succeeded in obtaining. She finds that in complex alliances the equity joint venture outperforms the pure contract mode, but that in simpler alliances the opposite is true. In
short, practice confirms theory; structure matters.
She also looked at alliance successes as a function of prior alliance experience. She found that the more alliances you do, the
better you get at them; that recent experience is more valuable than
older experience; and that experience is most important for success
in equity joint ventures - i.e., alliances with highly uncertain activities. During the symposium colloquy, she also noted that firms
with wide experience in alliances have begun to institutionalize
their alliance design and management processes. She concludes
4

See Rachelle C. Sampson, The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 909 (2003).
.
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that since structure matters and lawyers can play a critical role in
designing alliances structures, lawyers should not be excluded or
slighted in negotiating alliances.
The first commentator on Professor Sampson's presentation
was Professor Susan Helper, an economist at our Weatherhead
School of Management who has, inter alia, closely studied supplier-customer relations in the automobile industry. 5 She first
notes that factors that were omitted from Professor Sampson's
study, rather than choice of alliance structure, could account for
differences in there success - i.e., we cannot necessarily conclude
that alliances that obtained fewer patents chose the wrong structure. She also discusses how one or both partners may have other
goals than to maximize the number of patents obtained. For example, one partner may be primarily interested to learn more about
a product, industry, or market.
She discusses how a major purpose of an alliance may also be
to get acquainted with a partner with whom one may eventually
want a closer relationship. Accordingly, alliance partners typically
start with a small project and progress to larger, more complex
projects if their initial experiences are positive. In such cases, mutual trust accumulated over time may substitute for carefully
drafted contract provisions and control structures.
Finally, Professor Helper suggests that lawyers may play a
significant role in designing the proper incentives, like incentives
to encourage people to share information. Toward this end it may
be desirable to de-emphasize more traditional legal concerns, like
intellectual property rights.
The second commentator on Professor Sampson was Sanjiv
Kapur, a corporate lawyer with wide experience in international
alliances. 6 He noted that the terms of ail alliance may be influenced by its purpose; e.g., whether it entails cross-border marketing as opposed to research and development. He also noted that
legal issues, like firm liability, fiduciary duties, and the need for a
domestic partner in a foreign market, influence choice of alliance
structure.
He then listed some potentially significant business considerations not previously mentioned. For example, some firms want an
alliance to be a separate entity in order to encourage the individuals participating in the alliance to identify with it and to be ex5
See Susan R. Helper, Governing Alliances: Advancing Knowledge and Controlling
Opportunism, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 929 (2003).
6
See Sanijv K. Kapur, Structuring and Negotiating International Joillt Venntres: Anecdotal Evidence from a Large Law Firm Practice, 53 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 937 (2003).
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posed to a new culture. Accounting and tax considerations may
also play a role. He agreed with Professor Sampson that complexity weighs in favor of an equity joint venture structure.
Finally, Mr. Kapur discussed his experience with several deals
that either were never consummated or fell apart. In both contexts
he noted the importance of changing needs and circumstances. He
later noted that one kind of significant change is a change in the
personnel in one partner, since trust rests partly on personal contact. Further, he discusses how the facts regarding each deal are
unique, so that generalizations are hazardous. During the symposium colloquy, he discussed the importance of providing for termination since so many alliances do eventually unravel.
The last presentation was my own, which focused on the problems lawyers face because strategic alliances are so different from
the other business transactions they usually handle. 7 First, the
goals of partners vary and may not be apparent to the lawyer.
Second, although partners often shun protracted negotiations and
long, detailed agreements, the lawyer may be blamed if the client
comes to grief because of a gap in the contract. Accordingly, the
lawyer must consult with the Client about its goals, its expectations, and its willingness to assume various risks more than in
other deals.
Alliances involve complex situations with great uncertainty
that can never be completely eliminated by a detailed contract, so
the parties must rely more on trust than on legal enforcement of
contract terms. This, too, is unusual and problematic for lawyers.
The role of advocate or hired gun that is instilled in lawyers can
backfire by eroding the trust that is crucial to the success of an alliance. Instead, the lawyer has to strive for win-win solutions to
problems that will please the other party, without neglecting the
needs of the client.
The need of partners to trust and cooperate, often for many
years, means that lawyers face greater difficulties in designing
governance and termination mechanisms and protecting confidential information and property rights from opportunism. For the
same reasons, disagreements are likely to occur, but litigation is
impractical if the alliance is to continue. Therefore, the lawyer
must devise dispute resolution mechanisms that maintain trust and
cooperation. Because alliances are so diverse, lawyers cannot resort to their favorite drafting technique, which is simply to change

7
See George W. Dent, Jr., The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 953 (2003).
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the names from their last deal. Training lawyers to handle these
problems will require major changes in legal education.
Although diversity is often trumpeted as a strength, it is often
an obstacle to the creation of trust; people tend to trust those who
are like themselves and to distrust those who are different. Sociologists and psychologists have discussed techniques for overcoming distrust born of diversity, and lawyers need to know these
techniques. However, Professor Sampson noted in later colloquy
that, despite the difficulties of fostering trust between diverse people, alliances of diverse parties often produce superior results.
The first commentator on my presentation was Hewitt Shaw, a
respected tax lawyer. 8 He argued that, despite the need for trust
between allies, efficiency is served when each lawyer zealously
represents his client. However, in so doing a lawyer must act with
more finesse and understanding for the situation than in many
other commercial arrangements. He stressed that often partners
have very different firm cultures. For an alliance to succeed, the
parties and their lawyers must recognize and cope with these differences. The lawyer's instinct to identify questions and nail down
answers is extremely useful in this regard.
Mr. Shaw noted that after a contract is signed, the partners often disregard it; instead, they use the contract as a backup in case
major disputes arise. Nonetheless, the process of reaching agreement is an important step in educating the partners as to what to
expect from the alliance. He stressed that the shorter, less comprehensive contracts that business people often profess to favor
can be both difficult to draft and dangerous in their incompleteness. He advised lawyers to alert their clients to gaps in the agreement.
Shaw reminded us that the trust needed for alliances is not
blind faith. It rests largely on understanding how the partner's
goals coincide with one's own and how they differ. Such a cleareyed understanding is necessary to avoid unrealistic expectations
about one's partner. Shaw also discussed the difficult questions of
loyalty that can arise when a lawyer for one partner is asked to advise management of an alliance while also owing duties to the
other party.
The last commentator in the Symposium was Wendy Shiba, a
former professor of law, who contributed the unique perspective of

8
See Hewitt B. Shaw, Jr., The Role of Outside Counsel in Forming Strategic Alliances,
53 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 965 (2003).
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the in-house counsel. 9 She began by noting that the common comparison of alliances to marriage is problematic because, unlike
spouses, partners often enter an alliance because of their differences and their contrasting strengths, and not because of their
compatibility. She further noted that the design of the alliance depends in part on whether the partners expect to remain separate or
whether they see the alliance as possibility leading to an acquisition.
Ms. Shiba reiterated Steve Fraidin' s point that change-incontrol clauses can wreak havoc and therefore should be reviewed
carefully by lawyer and client. Related thereto, she stressed the
importance of due diligence to determine, inter alia, whether the
possible partner has change-in-control or non-competition agreements that might interfere with the proposed alliance. She also
reiterated the importance of fiduciary duties; e.g., clarifying the
fiduciary obligations of employees of a partner who will be directors or agents of the alliance.
Shiba discussed the role of in-house counsel, particularly the importance of maintaining an independent voice, even if it means advising the business people to abandon a deal to which they are emotionally committed. She repeated the importance of getting the lawyer
involved early in the deal and noted that in-house counsel may enjoy
an advantage in that regard. As Jeanne Rickert noted in later colloquy, in-house counsel usually understands the firm's business better
than outside counsel can. Ms. Shiba suggested that outside counsel
should try to learn the client's business by arranging tours and briefings without charge to the client. She also mentioned alternative billing strategies that might benefit both client and lawyer. Finally, she
suggested that business people are becoming disenchanted with complex joint venture arrangements and may be moving to simpler alliances, like licensing agreements.
This Leet Symposium is the first such event in legal academia
to focus on strategic alliances; it certainly will not be the last. The
economic importance of alliances is large and growing rapidly.
Alliances are also increasingly important to lawyers and the law,
but neither lawyers nor legal scholars have adequately addressed
the distinctive problems that alliances create. I hope that this Symposium will ignite an interest in resolving this shortcoming.
GEORGE W. DENT, JR. t
9
See Wendy C. Shiba, Representation of Joint Ventures: A Practical Perspective from
In-House Counsel, 53 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 971 (2003).
t Schott-vanden Eynden Professor of Business Organizations Law, School of Law, Case
Western Reserve University.

STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND
CORPORATE CONTROL
Stephen Fraidint and Radu Lelutiu*

INTRODUCTION

News about the formation and dissolution of joint ventures
seems to be a permanent feature of today' s business world. 1 Yet,
the recent proliferation of the joint venture form was hardly a surprise. Numerous authors writing at the beginning at the 1990s signaled that the joint venture would become a preferred vehicle for
the pursuit of corporate opportunities, one that under the right circumstances is preferable to outright acquisition and a favored
means through which companies would seek to enhance their ability to compete in the global markets. 2 These predictions were undoubtedly correct, as the last decade has witnessed both an unprecedented increase in the number of joint ventures formed
around the globe, 3 and an unexpected complexity in the nature of
the agreements that govern alliances. 4
Partner at Kirkland & Ellis, New York.
Student at Columbia Law School.
I The Article uses "joint venture" and "strategic alliance" interchangeably.
2 See, e.g., J. Michael Schell & Marc J. Segalman, New Deal Structures in the 1990's:
Mergers of Equals and Strategic Alliances, in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL i991 575
(PLI Corp. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 731, 1991) (discussing the factors that made
strategic alliances a method of investment preferable to the straight acquisition and noting that
the then-recent decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware in Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990), recognizing long-term corporate goals as a concern
that a company's board of directors may legitimately entertain, made the 1990s an opportune
time for engaging in strategic alliances); see also Stephen M. Besen, An Oven,iew of Strategic
Alliances, 8 No.7 INSIGHTS 22 (1994) ('"Strategic alliance' is a buzzword of the 1990s. One
can scarcely open a newspaper without reading about the latest alliance and the tremendous
potential opportunities for its participants. From large scale alliances such as British Telecom/MCI, Time Warner/US West and British Air/US Air to start-ups like 3DO or General
Magic, large and small companies are seeking strategic partners to enter new markets, develop
new products and technologies, promote new standards or otherwise cooperate to gain advantages in the marketplace.").
3 See, e.g., Jeff Coburn, All for One: Strategic Alliances Between Firms Are Good for
Clients, Business, 17 No.5 LEGAL MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 46-47 ("[I]f the 1980s was the
'Decade of the Merger/Acquisition' then the 1990s is becoming the 'Decade of the Strategic
Alliance."').
4 See Stephen Fraidin & Douglas Pepe, Emerging Challenges of Joint Venture Transactions, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CURRENT AND EMERGING ISSUES 1998 349, 358 (ALIABACourseofStudy,Nov.12-13,1998).
t

t
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As a result, especially over the past decade, joint ventures
have received a lot of attention from practitioners, as well as from
legal and economic scholars. A survey of prior literature, however, reveals that the overwhelming body of existing articles in the
area attempt to answer concrete pragmatic questions, and most often, "how to implement a successful joint venture." While keeping
these important practical aspects in mind, this Article approaches
the joint venture concept from a slightly different perspective and
addresses a related yet distinct set of concerns- namely, the interplay between the joint venture agreement and the impact of the
alliance on the joint venturers, both in terms of governance and
control. The authors believe that the success of a strategic alliance
can be maximized if the impact of its underlying arrangement on
aspects of governance and control of the venturers is understood. 5
To that end, this Article raises a number of questions.
The Article begins by exploring the complex fiduciary duty
issues that arise in the context of joint venture agreements. Drawing on existing scholarship, the Article argues that vexing dilemmas are likely to mark the destiny of such joint enterprises. The
common nature of joint venture agreements, together with likely
changes in the ownership and business strategies of the parent
companies, make such issues unavoidable. To alleviate those dilemmas and to prevent opportunism, the Article argues that when
contemplating a joint venture arrangement, certain companies
should try to encourage their potential business ally to issue equity
for their benefit in connection with the joint venture. 6 Further, the
Article warns that, despite their beneficial impact, these decisions
raise a number of difficulties and are potentially subject to judicial
scrutiny under the more exacting standard set forth by the Dela-

5 By "success," this Article means not only fmancial gain for the joint venturers, but also
the lack of discord and the maximization of cooperation between the members of the alliance.
As scholars oftentimes note, the term "success" in the context of strategic alliances has a more
opaque meaning than in usual circumstances. See George Dent, Lawyers and Trust in Business
Alliances, 58 Bus. LAw. 45, 60 (2002) ("[G]oals are often vaguer in alliances than in other
deals; the aim may be no more specific than the optimal exploitation of each other's research
capabilities.").
6 This is indeed oftentimes done in practice. This Article does not address the antitrust
concerns that might surround cross-equity joint ventures. According to the authors' research, no
articles have addressed this discrete issue. For general treatment of the antitrust issues raised by
joint venture agreements, see Ronan P. Harty, Joint Ventures and Antitrust, in INTERNATIONAL
JOINT VENTURES 2002 99 (PLI Comm. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 835, 2002);
Joseph F. Bradley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1521 (1982); Richard
J. Hoskins, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures and Competitor Collaborations: A Primer for
the Corporate Lawyer, 10 U. MIAMI. Bus. L. REv. 119 (2002); Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust
Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview, 66 ANTITRUST L. J. 701 (1998).
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ware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co} and
other cases that follow Unocal. The Article suggests that, in order
. for those decisions to be immune from judicial second-guessing,
the parents should carefully examine the implications of these equity investments, while aiming to comply with a heightened standard of care.
The Article is divided into five parts. Part I commences by
discussing joint ventures in general and then proceeds to explore
the business purposes served by these entities. Part II discusses
two themes of interest from the existing legal scholarship which
have a bearing on the issue of corporate control. Specifically, Part
II traces two debates: (1) whether joint venture agreements should
be negotiated so as to include as many details as possible (the
"thorough contracting" approach), or so as to only outline the basic
terms of the parties' agreement (the "flexibility" approach); and
(2) the status of fiduciary duties in the context of joint venture
agreements. Part III attempts to illustrate the practical dilemmas
that confront the parents of a joint venture. It does so by reproducing and analyzing the history of Time Warner Entertainment, a
celebrated joint venture whose lengthy destiny not only illustrates
the venturers' expectations vis-a-vis the alliance, but also how unexpected developments can lead them to impasses once their respective paths diverge. Building on the previous sections, Part IV
explores the desirability of equity investment arrangements undertaken in connection with joint venture agreements. This section
sets forth several factors whose presence might make equity investments in the potential business partner desirable for one or
both parent companies. Finally, Part V discusses specific issues of
corporate governance and control that arise in the context of joint
ventures with an equity component, and suggests solutions for effectively dealing with such challenges.
I.

BUSINESS PURPOSES SERVED BY THE JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT

The joint venture, also known as a strategic alliance, is a
means by which parties pool their resources and combine their efforts for profit. 8 An overview of the various types of ventures or7 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (noting that a fiduciary duty exists to protect the corporate
enterprise, which includes protecting stockholders from reasonably perceived harm, and requiring reasonable and good faith grounds for corporate actions).
8 See 46 AM. JUR 2Dloint Ventures§ 1 (1994) ("A joint venture is frequently defined as
an association of two or more persons formed to carry out a single business enterprise for profit.
More specifically, it is an association of persons with intent ... to engage in and carry out a
single business venture for joint profit, for which purpose such persons combine their property,
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ganized in the 1990s reveals that they can be categorized in seven
categories: technology distribution ventures; cross-licensing arrangements and joint product development ventures; industry coordination ventures; research consortia; start-up ventures; access to
foreign markets arrangements; and, 'no paradigm' ventures. 9
The explanations conventionally offered for the parties' willingness to form joint ventures are straightforward: parties unite
their individual resources with an expectation that the resulting
whole will be greater than the sum of its constituent parts. 10 As
such, cooperative alliances adequately answer efficiency concerns
and provide complex competitive and synergistic advantages over
traditional investment arrangements. 11 Modern strategic alliances
respond to concerns that fall in five categories: geographical access concerns; risk minimization; access to strategic resources and
globalization concerns; marketing, joint product development, and
network benefits; and the synergy test.
A.

Geographical Access Concerns

The fall of the Iron Curtain and the recent shifting political
paradigms across the globe were followed by the emergence of
previously untapped markets which displayed great investment

money, effects, skill, and knowledge . . . . "); see also Ron Ben-Yehuda, Joint Ventures, in
STRUCfURING, NEGOTIATING & IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 2001 247 (PLI Corp.
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1260, 2001) (A joint venture typically involves "an association of economically independent business entities (the 'Venturers') for a common commercial purpose of defined scope and duration, by contract or in the form of a new business entity,
and by means of which the Venturers pool resources and share risks, rewards and control .... ");
cf Bradley, supra note 6, at 1526 ("(A] joint venture may be defined for antitrust purposes as an
integration of operations between two or more separate firms, in which the following conditions
are present: (1) the enterprise is under the joint control of the parent firms, which are not under
related control; (2) each parent makes a substantial contribution to the joint enterprise; (3) the
enterprise exists as a business entity separate from its parents; and (4) the joint venture creates
significant new enterprise capability in terms of new productive capacity, new technology, a
new product, or entry into a new market.").
9 Fraidin & Pepe, supra note 4, at 352-55.
10 V. Scott Killingsworth, Form, Function and Fairness: Structuring the Technology Joint
Venture, 15 No.3 COMPUTER LAW, Mar. 1998, at 1, 3.
11 See Richard D. Harroch, Strategic Alliances, in STRUCfURING, NEGOTIATING & IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 1997 121 (PLI Corp. Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. 1002, 1997) (listing benefits of strategic alliances and providing comparisons among strategic alliances and other alternatives); KATHRYN RUDIE HARRIGAN, MANAGING FOR JOINT VENTURE SuccESS 17 (1986) (listing among one of the competitive advantages that joint ventures
allow firms to gain larger access to capital); see also Ben-Yehuda, supra note 8 (noting that
joint ventures allow for the pooling of resources and the sharing of risks); Bradley, supra note 6,
at 1525 ("By integrating certain operations of the participating firms, a joint venture creates
additional productive capacity through the formation of a new producing organization, the development of a new product or technology, or the entry into a new market.").
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potential. 12 However, most, if not all, of these markets were regulated by arcane and parochial laws and were controlled by biased
law-enforcing institutions. 13 The risk of dispute resolution before
one of these tribunals and the impossibility of compliance with
complicated regulatory schemes made traditional-type corporate
entities a risky option for investors interested in pursuing opportunities in the newly-discovered markets. 14
Oftentimes developed to deal with local, cultural, or social
barriers to investment in a particular locale, the joint venture
agreement attempts to circumvent these geography-related concerns. 15 For instance, a Western investor that wishes to pursue a
business opportunity abroad may be deterred by requirements such
as local incorporation, certain mandatory quotas of local ownership, or compliance with unfavorable local laws. However, because the joint venture form is a creature of contract, 16 the availability of strategic alliance arrangements allows foreign investors
to circumvent the necessity of local incorporation and that of compliance with complicated local regulatory mechanisms. 17 This alternative also allows parties to minimize their amenability to suit
in the local courts that they perceive as inadequate, since the preferable option of arbitration before government-neutral or other impartial tribunals is available through contract negotiations. 18
12 Blaine V. Fogg & Stephen F. Arcana, Strategic Partnerships and Alliances, in ACQUISITIONS, MERGERS, SPIN-OFFS AND OTHER RESTRUCTURINGS 1993 407,411 (PLI Corp. Practice
Course, Handbook Series No. 825, 1993) (noting the increasing globalization of business in the
early 1990s due to political changes such as the fall of the Iron Curtain).
·
13 See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 7 {2d ed. 2001)
(describing the benefits of arbitration in such markets).
14 See Erika P. Schultz, Joilll Venture Agreements: A New Mechanism for Investing in
Colombia, 12 WoRLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 190 (2001) (explaining that the joint venture
provides a way of avoiding a regulated formal process and a mechanism for deciding any disputes).
15 See generally Steven R. Salbu, Parental Coordination and Conflict in International
Joillf Ventures: The Use of Contract to Address Legal, Linguistic, and Cultural Concerns, 43
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1221 (1993) (analyzing the role of joint ventures in transactional business activity).
16 See 46 AM. JUR 2D Joint J!emures § 18 (1994) ('The rights, duties, and obligations of
joint venturers, as between themselves, depend primarily upon the terms of the contract by
which they assumed that relationship.").
17 See Schultz, supra note 14, at 191 (noting that because joint venture have a specific
purpose stipulated by agreement, they do not require the incorporation of a new legal entity, and
allow parties to escape local regulatory procedures and to structure their relationships as they
please).
IB See Hans Smit, The Future of lmenzationol Commercial Arbitration: A Single TI·ollSnotional Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 8, 9 (1986) ("Rather than permit international
disputes to be settled in national courts, many parties often prefer to submit them to a tribunal
that is not part of the governmental structure of a particular state .... Nationalistic favoritism
can ... be avoided by selecting a forum in a neutral state .... "). Notably, most developing nations, and all of the former communist states, are signatories to the United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958 (the New
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Risk Minimization

The economic instability which typically characterizes emerging markets made entrepreneurs interested in pursuing the new
possibilities cautious. Would-be investors believed that substantial
traditional-type cash investments were threatened by uncharted
risks. 19 Additionally, as already stated, the legal uncertainty surrounding the new markets heightened the level of insecurity and
consequently the potential investors' sense of discomfort. 20
The concept of joint venture provides a simple answer to these
problems. Its essential characteristics - profit sharing and risk
minimization - make the joint venture form a particularly suitable
method for reaching toward potentially profitable but uncertain
markets. 21
C.

Access to Strategic Resources and Globalization Concerns

From an economic perspective, the increase in the number and
types of joint venture agreements was an answer to the perceived
need for serving global clients. 22 Simply put, in industries where
capital investment was prohibitively high and required a substantial time commitment, the cooperation fostered by the joint venture
form provides a most desirable altemative. 23 Resorting to joint
venture agreements not only allows local companies to export their

York Convention), codified at 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1999). The New York Convention was a significant step toward enforcement of arbitration provisions contained in contracts that fall within its
scope, and similarly, toward the enforcement of arbitral awards.
19 See Steven R. Salbu & Richard Brahm, Planning Versus Contracting for International
Joint Venture Success: The Case for Replacing Contract With Strategy, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283 (1993) [hereinafter Planning Versus Contracting] (pointing out that most strategic
alliances target volatile and unpredictable environments, extend into cultures unfamiliar or
uncomfortable with Western corporate notions, and are chosen by parties for their peculiar
ability to meet the demands of succeeding under such conditions or, in other words, for their
ability of "riding the wave.").
20 See id.
21 See Fogg & Arcana, supra note 12, at 414-16 (noting that, while risks still exist in the
context of joint venture agreements, the parties have the option of addressing them ex ante, a
fact which makes the joint venture a less risky investment method than an acquisition); see also
discussion infra.
22 See Coburn, supra note 3, at 46; see also William J. Kolasky, Jr., Structuring, Negotiating & Implementing Strategic Alliances: Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for Strategic Alliances, 1063 PLI/CORP 499, 502 (1998) (noting that strategic alliance arrangements are becoming increasingly more important to global competitiveness).
23 See Rafiq Al-Shahbaz, Note, Joint Ventures, ASEAN and the Global High Technology
Industry, 18 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 327 (1993) (arguing for a rethinking of the treatment of joint
ventures to encourage entrepreneurship and cooperation in industries where capital investment
is prohibitively high and requires years of development to produce competitive consumer products).
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products to distant markets with minimal costs, 24 but it also eases
the movement "from vertical to 'virtual' integration."25 As a result, companies focused on adding value in the areas where they
excel are able to "off-load and manage the rest of the value chain
through cooperative relationships and alliances." 26 Entering into
strategic alliances allows parties to become more competitive and
efficient through the sharing of facilities and data in unconcentrated or moderately concentrated markets. 27 This process results
in substantial savings which, in turn, are passed on to the consumers.28

D.

Marketing, Joint Product Development, and Network Benefits

On a closely related point, from a technology point of view,
the 1990s witnessed the climax of high technology and industries
characterized by short product cycles, technical interdependence of
products, fluid standards, and globalization of markets. 29 Given
the prevailing market conditions, former competitors soon realized
the difficulties inherent in exploiting the full potential of new inventions before they became obsolete. 30 Additionally, the complex
fusion of computer, communications, and consumer electronics
industries made it plain that the former competitors needed to collaborate in order to survive and remain competitive. 31
Because a strategic alliance can take the shape of crosslicensing agreements, joint marketing or distribution and sale
agreements, joint product development arrangements, or various
consortia, it provides an effective response to the short-lived product cycles and ensuing necessity to quickly exploit a product's full
potential before it becomes obsolete. 32
24 See Scott C. Withrow, Strategic Alliance for Small Businesses (with Form), PRAC.
LAw, July 2000, at 11, 13 (arguing that strategic alliances preserve the advantages of the small
business and leverage these with the marketing resources of a large enterprise).
25 Charles T.C. Compton, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coalition: A Perspective on
the Types and Purposes ofTechnology Joint Ventures, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 861, 869 (1993).
26 !d. (quoting Prof. James Brian Quinn of Dartmouth College).
27 See Svetlana Mosin, Riding the Merger Wave: Strategic Alliances in the Airline Industry, 27 'TRANSP. L. J. 271, 272 (2000) (discussing the reasons why competitor airline industry
players opt to enter into strategic alliances).
28 ld.
29 See V. Scott Killingworth, Strategic Licensing: Leveraging Technology Through Alliances, CYBERSPACE LAW, Sept. 1998, at 13 (discussing the key legal and conceptual tools
available in the licensing context).
30 /d.
3! See Compton, supra note 25, at871-77.
32 /d. at 869; see also Brodley, supra note 6, at 1528-29 ("(J]oint ventures can effect
economies of scale in research not achievable through single-firm action. Because of these
advantages, joint ventures are especially likely to provide an optimal enterprise form in undertakings involving high risks, technological innovations, or high information costs.").
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Synergy Test

Finally, as commentators point out, a joint venture often paves
the way to a merger between its parent companies. 33 As such, the
joint venture arrangement may serve to test the compatibility of
the parent companies before a full-blown merger is pursued.
II.

Two THEMES OF INTEREST

As previously mentioned, there have been a substantial number of articles written about strategic alliances. Virtually the entire
body of existing literature on the topic addresses the practical side
of implementing a successful strategic alliance. There are, however, two aspects discussed in the prior literature that merit discussion for purposes of this Article: (1) flexibility versus thorough
contracting in the context of joint venture agreements; and (2) special fiduciary duties that arise in the context of joint ventures.

A.

Flexibility or Thorough Contracting

As mentioned previously, joint ventures have been understood
as creatures of contract. As such, numerous authors writing on the
topic, most notably Stephen Glover, Zenichi Shishido, and Steven
Salbu and Richard Brahm, point to the fact that by resorting to the
joint venture form, the venturing parties are able to consider potential problems in advance and to resolve them ex ante via contract
negotiations. 34 The partisans of ex ante problem-solving strategies
argue that risk minimization, one of the beneficial consequences
the joint venture form promises, requires that potential uncertainties be muted in advance as much as practically possible. The argument certainly makes sense - because there are no joint venture
statutes to ease the parties' dilemmas and little common law on
point, 35 the joint venturers should attempt to deal with the unknown and thus spell out their intentions in advance. 36

See Harroch, supra note 11, at 124.
See, e.g., Stephen I. Glover, Joillt Ventures and Opportunity Doctrine Problems, INSIGHTS, Nov. 1995, at 9-10; see also David E. Brown, Jr., Kathryn M. Cole & Joseph A. Smith,
Jr., Strategic Alliances: Why, How, and What to Watch For, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 57, 61
(1999); Salbu & Brahm, supra note 19, at 286; Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a Joint Venture, 39 HASTINGS L. J. 63,90 (1987).
35 See Adam B. Weissburg, Note, Reviewing the Lnw on Joint Ventures with an Eye Toward the Future, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 487 (1990) (noting the absence of such statutes, criticizing
the common law treatment of joint ventures, and arguing that legislatures should consider enacting a statute that contains provisions ensuring that the legal stance towards the joint venture
protects the venturers' intent.).
36 See Bradley, supra note 6, at 1527 ("[I]f [the drafters of the joint venture agreement]
leave some of the terms open, there will be problems of opportunism (the tendency of economic
33
34

2003]

STRATEGIC ALLIANCES & CORPORATE CONTROL

873

On the other hand, it is also well-established that one of the
most important advantages of the joint venture form lies in its
flexibility and its ability to adapt to unforeseen, ever-changing,
market conditions. 37 Moreover, even the partisans of the previous
approach, such as Stephen Glover, recognize that the joint venture
form is an atypical investment mechanism, which defies the expectations commonly associated with other investment methods. 38
Writers who examine the issue warn that excessive focus on ownership and control may diminish the effectiveness of the venture. 39
Contrary to popular belief, less structured and more flexible approaches to designing a joint venture and "fifty-fifty" -type arrangements with regards to control and ownership are statistically
more likely to lead to a successful venture and are consequently
often preferred to other approaches. 40
The advocates of this latter approach, most notably George
W. Dent, Jr., are also skeptical that the law of contracts can even
provide an effective answer to problems that may arise in connection with strategic alliance agreements. 41 Even leaving aside the
impossibility of foreseeing the future, 42 the need for flexibility,
which is essential to the success of the joint enterprise, undermines
attempts to "pre-resolve" matters by means of contractual arrangements. Discrediting the view that ex ante contract negotiations can provide the satisfactory answer, the advocates of the latter position instead suggest that we should look to "gap fillers" and
"fiduciary duties" notions for a more viable solution.43
agents to behave with stealth and guile) and information imbalance (the discrepancy in knowledge between parties that intensifies the effects of opportunism).").
37 See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties in Strategic Alliances,
57 Bus. LAW 55, 90-91 (2001) (arguing that because strategic alliances depend heavily on trust
and cooperation, the contractual duties and obligations of the strategic partners can only be
vaguely traced in advance); see also Coburn, supra note 3, at 48.
38 See Stephen I. Glover, Negotiating and Structuring Joillt Velltures: Lessons from Managemellt Consultallts, M & A LAW, Feb. 1998, at 18 (arguing that lawyers' risk aversion may
undermine joint ventures and diminish their prospects for success).
39 See William l Schwartz, Legal Issues Raised by Strategic Alliances Involving Multimedia, COMPUTER LAW, Nov. 1993, at 19-20.
40 /d. (summarizing relevant statistical data contained in studies undertaken by McKinsey
& Company and Booz-Allen & Hamilton).
41 See Dent, supra note 37, at 77-80 (noting that contracts will be incomplete due to the
prohibitive expense of drafting for a large number of contingencies).
42 See Brodley, supra note 6, at 1527 ("[I]f [the drafters of a joint venture agreement]
attempt to specify their mutual obligations exhaustively, they will encounter a bounded rationality problem- that is, an inability to foresee or to anticipate all future contingencies.").
43 The difference between the two is explained by Dent as follows: "Gap fillers and fiduciary duties are similar in many ways and the line between them is not bright. Both embody
duties not drafted by the parties but imposed by law. Fiduciary duties may be seen as a subset
of the broader category of gap fillers. Fiduciary duties differ, though, from gap fillers that are
merely technical .... " Dent, supra note 37, at 71.
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It is clear that the most plausible answer to the question
whether it makes sense to minimize risks at the cost of restraining
the potential success of the venture lies in a balancing test. The
process of maximizing the likelihood that a venture succeeds as a
profitable enterprise (the businessperson's goal) while minimizing
various risks to the parent44 (the lawyer's goal) is most likely to
occur when the lawyers and business people fully understand each
others' potential contribution and orchestrate the negotiating process of the venture so their joint skills are applied at the right time. 45
B.

Fiduciary Duties in the Context of Joint Venture Relationships

Although joint ventures provide a viable solution to investors
who seek to maximize profits while minimizing risks, resorting to
the joint venture form leads to complications in the area of fiduciary duties.
The rights, duties, and obligations of joint venturers depend to
a great extent upon the terms of the contract by which they assumed relationships within the joint venture. 46 Additionally, the
default rule provides that,
the relationship between joint venturers, like that existing between partners, is fiduciary in character and imposes upon all
the participants the obligation of loyalty to the joint concern
in all matters affecting the conduct of the venturer's business.47
Thus, the founding members of a joint venture owe each other
and the common alliance fiduciary duties, which in tum divide into
duties of care and duties of loyalty. 48
The traditional analysis of fiduciary duties is more complex in
the context of joint ventures. After a collaborative enterprise is
44 For a discussion of risks that arise in the context of joint ventures see William P.
O'Neil, Advanced issues in Strategic Alliances, in STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING & IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 2000 351 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. B-1193, 2000).
45 David Ernst & Stephen I. Glover, Strategic Alliances: Combining Legal and Business
Best Practices to Create Successful Strategic Alliances, INSIGHTS, Oct. 1997, at 6, 6.
46 46 AM. JUR 2D Joint Ventures§ 18 (1994).
47 46 AM. JUR 2DJoint Ventures§ 33 (1994).
48 See Brown, Cole & Smith, Jr., supra note 34, at 92-93. The "duty of care" is defined in
Section 4.01(a) of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance as "a duty
to the corporation to perform the director's or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that
he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation, and with the care that
an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and
under similar circumstances." The "duty of loyalty" is the nebulous imperative that, as fiduciaries of the corporation, directors or officers may not usurp opportunities which belong to the
corporation.
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formed, a tripartite structure of fiduciary duties is instituted. 49 The
interlocking directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to their
sponsor, to the alliance, and, arguably, to their sponsor's new business partner. 50 The most complex issues concern the duty of
loyalty owed by the members to each other and to the joint venture, respectively .51 The difficulty is exacerbated because investors in many alliances are actual or potential competitors of the
enterprise in which they invest and because such investors often
participate in different alliances that may be competitive with each
other. 52 To complicate issues further, and as Part III of this Article
demonstrates, changes in the ownership or changes in the business
strategies of the parent companies are likely to occur while the
joint venture agreement is in existence. 53 Those changes not only
impact the future of the venture, but also further complicate the
task of the venture's directors who are torn between following the
interest of their sponsor and those of the alliance.
Joint venture arrangements thus lead to a paradigmatic embodiment of the representative director's dilemma 54 and illustrate

4 9 See Bradley, supra note 6, at 1527 (observing that the joint venture "differs from a
merger, because it typically involves the creation of a separate, limited-purpose firm, not a
union of two previously existing firms. Thus, the joint venture constitutes a functionally distinct
organizational form, and its advantages and other characteristics can be understood only by
keeping that distinction clearly in mind."); see also id. at 1529 ("There are, however, disadvantages in forming a joint venture. Compared with a single firm, the joint venture is a cumbersome organization. Control is divided, creating a problem of 'two masters."').
50 See Shishido, supra note 34. Whether the parent companies are each other's fiduciaries
would seem to depend on the terms of the joint venture agreement. If, by virtue of the agreement, there is a significant shift in ownership rights, such as when for instance confidential
information is disclosed as a result thereof, a fiduciary relationship may be created. See also D.
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 V AND. L. REv. 1399, 147677 (2002) ("As with confidential relationships, determining whether alliances are fiduciary
relationships is extremely fact-intensive, but the key facts still relate to allocation of ownership
rights .... The critical resource in this instance is confidential information, and the success or
failure of Tellabs' fiduciary duty claims should tum on whether it can convince a court that the
information in question is really 'confidential.' Without confidential information, Tellabs
would seem to have no viable fiduciary duty claim, as Riverstone appears to have used its own
assets to manufacture the products.").
51 See Smith, supra note 50, at 1476-77 (noting the fact-intensive process of determining
fiduciary relationships); see also Terence Woolf, Note, The Vemure Capitalist's Corporate
Opportunity Problem, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 473 (2001) (discussing the duty of loyalty
and the various tests developed by the court to explain what obligations must be fulfilled).
52 See Schwartz, supra note 39, at 23 (observing that strategic alliances relating to multimedia often involve partners that are competitors); see also Woolf, supra note 51, at 474 (observing that venture capitalists may owe loyalties to competing businesses).
53 See Bradley, supra note 6, at 1529 ("[E]ven when a negotiated balance is achieved, it
can be upset by changes in corporate goals, personnel, or parent control.").
54 Cyril Moscow, Corporate Governance: The Representative Director Problem, INSIGHTS, June 2002, at 12, 12 (outlining the representative director's dilemna of dividing loyalties
between the shareholders and sponsor).
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the vexing "difficulties of double-parenting." 55 The case law and
statutory authority on point fail to ease these tensions.
In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 56 the Supreme Court of Delaware
addressed the problem of the interested director. In reviewing a
cash-out merger between a parent company and its subsidiary, the
court wrote that "there is no dilution of this obligation [utmost
good faith and inherent fairness] where one holds dual or multiple
directorships, as in a parent-subsidiary context."57 Along the same
lines, statutory provisions impose equal fiduciary duties of good
management owed by interlocking directors or officers to both
special purpose vehicles and their sponsors. 58
As Cyril Moscow has pointed out, the dilemma of the representative director is not often considered. 59 Authors who have addressed the issue in the context of the duty of loyalty, while emphasizing the need for proper disclosure of directors' conflicts of
interest, 60 urge that the tests usu::tlly employed by courts to determine whether an usurpation of corporate opportunity has occurred
(the line of business test, 61 the fairness test, 62 the expectancy test, 63

55 Steven R. Salbu & Richard A. Brahm, Strategic Considerations in Designing Joint
Ve/lture Contracts, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 253,291 (1992).
56
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
57 /d. at710.
58 See James G. Leyden, Jr., A Key State's Approach to LLC's: Delaware Can Be Different, Bus. L. TODAY, May-June 2000, at 51, 59 (discussing at length the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 6 Del. C. §§ 18-101, et seq., and noting that, under prevailing law, if a
manager or a representative of a member also serves on the board of another entity, such as a
Delaware corporation that is a member of the DLLC, such manager or representative of a member will likely owe an equal fiduciary duty of good management to the DLLC and the member).
59 Moscow, supra note 54, at 12.
60 See Glover, supra note 38.
61 The "line of business" test was announced in the landmark case of Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5
A.2d 503 (Del. 1939), as follows:
if there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business opportunity which the corporation is fmancially able to undertake, is, from its
nature, in the line of the corporation's business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable
expectancy, and, by embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the
officer or director will be brought into conflict with that of his corporation, the law will not permit him to seize the corporate opportunity for
himself.
/d. at 511.
62 The "fairness" test was articulated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Dwfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 80 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 1948), as follows: the "true basis of
the governing doctrine rests fundamentally on the unfairness in the particular circumstances of a
director, whose relation to the corporation is fiduciary, 'taking advantage of an opportunity [for
his personal profit] when the interest of the corporation justly call[s] for protection."' /d. at 529.
63 The "expectancy" test, articulated by the Alabama courts in Lagarde v. Anniston Lime
& Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496 (1899), would look to whether the director or officer usurped a corporate opportunity in which "the corporation has an interest already existing or in which it has
an expectancy growing out of an existing right." /d. at 502.
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or the American Law Institute's guidelines 64 ) are not adequate for
application to the joint venture context. The common law tests
and the ALI principles do not offer sufficient guidance to a director or officer who holds multiple fiduciary obligations. 65 The alternative would be to either narrowly define the concept of corporate opportunity in the instruments that govern the alliance or to
contractually disclaim that loyalty duties attach. 66 However, while
the former alternative seems more or less illusory given the practical impossibility of drafting in anticipation of the unforeseen, 67 the
latter seems to undermine the very foundation of the joint venture
relationship, namely the existence of a relationship of trust. 68
Other commentators, most persuasively Cyril Moscow, call
for an abandonment of corporate law rhetoric altogether. While
recognizing that in an ideal world interested directors should attempt to fairly pursue the interests of all shareholders, these commentators argue that in the real world representative directors
should be allowed to maximize the interests of their sponsor to
some extent, as they are expected to do. 69 These "skeptics" recognize that there exists an insurmountable gap between the academic
discourse of corporate law, which holds representative directors to
the same standards of care and loyalty as independent directors,
and reality. 70 Questioning whether cases like Weinberger are anything more than attempts to create an artificial, unrealistic, and
ideal corporate model of director independence, they suggest a different approach that recognizes the representative directors' dilemma, allows contractual disclaimers of duties to a certain degree,
limits the directors' ability to unabashedly pursue sponsor interest,
but allows them to share information with their sponsor. 71

III. A JOINT VENTURE AT WoRK
The recently dissolved strategic alliance known as Time Warner Entertainment ("TWE") is a paradigmatic illustration of the
complexities that surround joint venture agreements. TWE, a
"wickedly confusing joint venture," 72 was created in 1991, when
Time Warner sold 12.5% of its movie and cable holdings to two
See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance§§ 5.05, 5.06 (1992).
See Woolf, supra note 51, at 473.
66 I d. at 498.
67 See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
6B See Dent, supra note 37, at 66-69.
69 See Moscow, supra note 54, at 18.
70 ld.
71 ld.
72 Marc Gunter & Stephanie N. Mehta, The Mess At AOL Time Warner: Can Steve Case
Make Sense ofThis Beast?, FORTUNE, May 2002, at 74.
64

65
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Japanese corporate giants, Toshiba Corp. and Itoh Cho Co., in exchange for $1 billion. 73 In 1993, TWE raised another $2.5 billion
when US West, Inc., purchased a 25% interest in the partnership. 74
At the time, telephone and cable companies were competing and
searching for ways to provide a "new generation of telecommunications services in the home, including video phone calling, movies on demand, interactive shopping services and hundreds of TV
channels." 75 US West's investment in the TWE partnership and its
joint venture agreement with Time Warner were perceived to benefit both companies as a way to finance the implementation of the
then novel "information superhighway. " 76 Other participants in
the telecommunications industry recognized the groundbreaking
nature of the deal, commenting that "over the next couple of decades, you're going to see a lot of joining together of cable and
telco industries." 77
The first discord between US West and Time Warner occurred
in 1995. Earlier that year, US West acquired MediaOne. Following the acquisition, US West created Media Group to control its
stake in TWE. 78 In the fall of 1995, Time Warner revealed plans
to acquire Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc. 79 US West announced that it disagreed with Time Warner's plans, arguing that
Time Warner, the general partner of TWE, breached its fiduciary
duty owed to the limited partners of TWE because the acquisition
would usurp a business opportunity of the partnership. Specifically, US West alleged that Time Warner's intended acquisition of
Turner would violate a non-compete agreement signed by TWE's
partners: Turner owned several cable networks which, if the acquisition were completed, would compete with the partnership's
Home Box Office (HBO) network; further, Turner's movie studios
were likely to compete with the Warner Brothers movie studios
controlled by TWE. 80 US West's suit, seeking to block the merger,
was filed minutes after the merger agreement had been signed by
Turner and Time :Warner, in March of 1996. 81 Despite its dis73 See Paul Farhi, Phone Firm Buying 25% Stake in Time Warner Entertainmellt, WASH.
POST, May 17, 1993, at Al.
74 ld.
75 ld.
76 ld.
77 New Slant On Old Arguments: US West Teams Up With Time Warner in 'Landmark'
Move For Telcos, COMM. DAILY, May 18, 1993, at 2.
78 Kelly Carroll, Last Call For Residential DSL?, TELEPHONY, Jan. 2000, available at
LEXIS, News Group File, AIL
79 US West Files Suit to Halt Time Warner-Turner Merger, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 22,
1995, available at LEXIS, News Group File, AIL
80 ld.
81 Carroll, supra note 78.
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agreement with Time Warner's acquisition, US West did not appeal the decision granting dismissal of the suit, which followed in
June later that year. 82
In June of 1998, US West spun off its Media Group. The spin
off led to the creation of a new entity, MediaOne Group, designed
to control the 25% stake in the TWE partnership. 83 In April of the
following year, AT&T announced that it was pursuing a $58 billion purchase of MediaOne Group. 84 AT&T's proposed acquisition of MediaOne was perceived to "strengthen AT&T's position
as the nation's leading cable provider and enhance the company's
ability to bundle voice, video, and Internet communications services to its customers." 85 Further, market analysts speculated that
the acquisition would benefit AT&T in the long run since Media One's stake in TWE was thought to be "an obstacle in the completion of a joint venture telephony relationship between AT&T
and Time Warner. " 86
On January 10, 2000, Time Warner announced new plans of
its own, agreeing to merge with America Online Inc. ("AOL") in a
$162 billion stock transaction. 87 The merger purported to "launch
the next Internet revolution." 88 It also marked a victory for America Online, a company that "had been fighting to gain access to the
high-speed Internet systems provided through cable companies." 89
In that respect, the merger was a defeat for AT&T and brought to a
halt the possibility of a substantial cooperation between AT&T and
Time Warner.
Following the announcement of the AOL-Time Warner
merger, AT&T signaled its desire to dissolve the TWE partnership.
Both AOL Time Warner and AT&T feared that the intricacy of
their relationship, and their very different visions of the future,
unduly confused investors. 9° Furthermore, following the news that
AT&T was selling its cable-TV business to a Time Warner com-

ld.
Jd.
84 Jd.
85 AT&T, Subsidiaries Affirmed by Fitch IBCA Following Bid for MediaOne, PR NEWSWlRE, Apr. 23, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
86 ld.
87 See, e.g., Tim Jones, Deal Transforms Media Landscape: $162 Billion Marriage Joins
internet, Cable and Content, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 11, 2000, at I.
8 8 Id. (citing Steve Case, the founder and clrief executive of America Online).
89 Jd.; see also Joshua Cho, AT&T Seeks to Dissolve Most Ns Thru Swaps, CABLE
WORLD, June 1999, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All (reporting America
82

83

Online's unsuccessful lobbying for access to AT&T' s broadband networks).
90 See Lisa Levenson, AT&T, AOL Time Warner Hire Bank of America to Appraise Venture, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 2, 2002, available at LEXIS, New Group File, All.
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petitor, Comcast Corp., 91 the purpose of AT&T's investment in the
partnership became unclear.
Pursuant to the terms of the TWE joint venture agreement, the
venturers possessed registration rights. After its acquisition of
MediaOne Group, AT&T inherited US West's right to cause a
public offering of TWE stock. 92 Alternatively, under the agreement, AT&T could require that AOL Time Warner buy as much of
its stake as the public would, pursuant to an opinion provided by
an investment banker. 93 Estimates valued AT&T's stake in TWE
at somewhere between $7.5 and $10 billion. 94 After failed attempts to agree on a fair price, AT&T commenced the process of
turning the venture into a publicly traded entity. 95
Because AOL Time Warner disfavored the idea of an IPO, intense negotiation yielded a different solution: AT&T received
about $2 billion in cash, about $1.5 billion in AOL Time W amer
stock, and approximately a 20% stake in a newly formed entity,
Time Warner Cable. 96 Comcast, Time Warner's competitor and
the acquirer of AT&T's cable-TV operations, inherited the 20%
stake in Time Wamer Cable and an option of later selling it as part
of an initial public offering. 97
Hence, after almost a decade since US West purchased its
stake in the partnership, the TWE venture was finally dissolved.
Its history illustrates the several assumptions that stand underneath
the arguments raised in the pages that follow:
e
Joint venture agreements serve as means by which the
venturers attempt to exploit synergistic factors with an expectation of profit. In TWE's case, the alliance was between the
telecommunications and the cable provider industries. 98

•
By entering strategic alliances, parent companies essentially make predictions about the future and resort to the joint
venture form to share the inherent risk. Here the prediction
was that the telecom-cable alliance would be fruitful in the
ld.
See Seth Schiesel & Andrew Ross Sorkin, AT&T Asks $1 Billion of AOL Time Warner,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at C2.
93 See id.
94 See Seth Schiesel, AT&T and AOL Are Said to Seek Delay in Evaluation of Joint Elltertainment Unit, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at C3.
95 See Seth Schiesel, AT&T, Writing Down Cable Assets, Post Big Loss, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 2002, at C4.
96 Seth Schiesel, AOL Time Warner Near Deal on a Unit, Again, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2002, atC4.
97 See id.
98 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
91

92
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future. 99 The prediction was correct since, over the course of
nearly a decade, US West's $2.5 billion investment matured
into a stake reportedly worth fourfold. 100
•
During the life of an alliance the parties to the venture
may undertake various metamorphoses. They may acquire
entities that threaten to compete with the venture, like Time
Warner who acquired Turner Broadcasting Systems. They
may be acquired by entities that try to pursue more comprehensive alliances with the other venturer(s), like MediaOne
who was acquired by AT&T.
•
During the life of the venture, its success notwithstanding, the parties' respective visions of the future may change.
In TWE's case, for instance, following AT&T's acquisition
of Media One, instead of opting to pursue a more comprehensive venture with the telecom giant, Time Warner chose to
pursue a merger with America Online, hoping that such an alliance would launch "the new Internet revolution." 101
IV.

THE DESIRABILITY OF AN EQUITY INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENT
TO SUPPLEMENT THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT

When should a venturer bargain for an equity stake in its potential ally? When should both venturers resort to cross-equity
investments? The following section commences by exploring
ways in which such arrangements might be beneficial to the common alliance; it then suggests a non-exhaustive list of factors that
should be considered before a decision to pursue these investments
is made.
Joint venture agreements are pursued in part because of their
ability to minimize risk. 102 Even so, risks are not always evenly
distributed between the venturers. Often, in a strategic alliance,
one of the venturers (VI) possesses the capital, while the other
venturer (V2) possesses, as sole assets, a research plan or certain
know-how. 103 In those circumstances a joint product alliance between the two entities would spread the risk unevenly between VI
and V2, and the two partners' respective commitments to the joint
99

See id.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
' 02 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
103 See Dent, supra note 5, at 73 ("[I)n some research and development alliances one party
does most of the research while the other (usually the larger firm and a potential user of the
product to be developed) provides financing.").
Joo
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effort might differ. To counterbalance these considerations, it
would make sense for V2 to try to acquire an equity stake in Vl.
By agreeing to issue common stock for V2's benefit, Vl would
most likely convince it of its commitment to the joint effort, to
their common financial future, and to the fairness of the transaction.104 Similarly, if Vl believes in the success of the alliance, it
will most likely wish to bargain for an equity stake in V2. Such a
stake would entitle it to share in V2' s future successes and allow it
to have a say in how that future should be fashioned.
In addition to binding the parties' interests and to ensuring
their sustained commitment to the venture, these investments can
answer more fundamental concerns. Cross-equity investments can
minimize corporate opportunity problems likely to occur in the
context of the joint venture: if V 1 decides to pursue a corporate
opportunity that arguably belongs to the venture, then V2 would
still share in the rewards. This might minimize the chances of
V2's disagreeing with Vl 's decision. In cross-equity joint ventures, the vexing fiduciary duty analyses are simplified, and the
efficient result may be more likely to prevail. 105
Furthermore, acquiring an equity stake allows a venturer to
protect itself from leakages of indirect value. In other words, by
asking V 1 to obtain an equity stake in V2, V2 can protect itself
from the eventuality that Vl might "appropriate know-how belonging to the other party or developed by the two parties
jointly." 106
That appropriation of know-how could occur inadvertently, as
there often is mobility among employees of the joint venture and
104 Id. at 63 ("An alliance needs trust and cooperation; it will not thrive if even one side
judges the deal unfair. People who feel abused often retaliate, even if they know that retaliation
is costly. In a bad contract both sides may withhold their best efforts. The stronger party should
seek fair terms, explain its proposals, and listen to its partner.").
105 Although, as previously stated, the antitrust concerns raised by cross-equity joint ventures are outside the ambit of this Article, it would seem that cross-equity investments - if indeed they allow for the efficient mechanisms of competition to impact the venturers' decisionmaking- would not raise significant antitrust policy issues. See Werden, supra note 6, at 704
("[A]ntitrust analysis of joint ventures depends a great deal on how the venture affects the independent decision making of its participants and which competitive strategies are affected.").
106 Dent, supra note 5, at 69. The leakage of indirect value could have been a reason why,
as part of a joint venture agreement signed by DuPont and Pioneer Hi-Bred, DuPont agreed to
purchase an equity stake in Pioneer Hi-Bred. DuPont "bought a 20 percent stake in Pioneer in
1997, giving DuPont access to Pioneer's knowledge of seed development." Michael Lovell, The
Cost of Consolidation, Is Des Moines on the Wrong End of M & A?, DES MolNES BUSINESS
RECORD, Oct. 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 13800637. In 1997, the two companies "began a
joint research project called Optimum Quality Grains LLC, which worked to produce new varieties of com and soybeans. Promising progress through the joint venture led DuPont to announce
in March 1999 that it would pay $7.7 billion for the 80 percent of Pioneer it didn't already
own." ld. Mr. Fraidin advised Pioneer Hi-Bred in connection with the 1997 joint venture and
again in connection with the 1999 acquisition.

2003]

STRATEGIC ALLIANCES & CORPORATE CONTROL

883

the parties to the venture. While an equity stake does not provide
precise protection against leakage, it can provide a level of practical fairness.
Professor Brodley noted in 1982 that "if [joint venturers]
leave some terms open, there will be problems of opportunism ...
and information imbalance." 107 The converse of Professor's Brodley 's argument is that by alleviating the tensions between the joint
venturers, by reducing the incentives for opportunism, and by evening out the information imbalance, cross-equity investments allow for more flexibility in the joint venture agreement. As previously discussed, it seems that the success of the venture is tied to
the degree of flexibility allowed for by the partnership agreement.108 Equity investments, whether unilateral or bilateral, undertaken in connection with a joint venture agreement would thus
seem to foster flexibility in their agreement.
Finally, as previously suggested, given that strategic alliances
often occur in concentrated markets where repeat players battle
each other for the same audience, the existence of an equity investment agreement between the joint venturers could minimize
the possibility that the assets of the venturers, or those of the joint
venture, would fall in the hands of a competitor. For instance, the
presence of such an investment in TWE' s case might have made
the Time Warner- Comcast alliance less likely . 109
To be sure, equity investments undertaken in connection with
a joint venture agreement are not always desirable. However,
there are instances where they can substantially contribute to the
success of the venture. To summarize, attention should be generally paid to the following factors:
•
The degree of risk posed by the alliance: Are risks distributed evenly?
•
The nature of the venturers: Is this the type of alliance
that might be conducive to an equity arrangement?

Bradley, supra note 6, at 1527.
See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
109 See supra text accompanying notes 91-97. However, for the same reasons, the existence of an equity investment agreement between VI and V2 might be deemed a defensive
maneuver under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). To prevent
the venturers' decision from judicial second-guessing, compliance with the factors set forth by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal and decisions that follow that case is required. See infra
discussion accompanying footnotes 134-39.
107

1os
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•
The potential that the parties' respective visions of the
future might change: Are the venturers engaged in the type of
industry where staying ahead of the competition is essential?
•
The level of trust otherwise existent between the venturers: Can the venturers establish sufficient trust absent an
equity arrangement?
•
The level of flexibility otherwise achievable in the joint
venture agreement: Can the joint venturers allow for sufficient flexibility in their agreement absent an equity arrangement?
•
The potential for leakage of indirect value: Does one of
the venturers possess a certain unique know-how?
•
The degree to which the venturers wish to bind their respective financial futures: Do the venturers believe that the
alliance is a "synergy test"? 110
•
The nature of the market where the alliance takes place
and the degree of likelihood that a competitor would attempt
to acquire the assets of the venture or of one of its parents:
Do the venturers believe that an investment arrangement
might help avoid those results?

V.

THE IMPACT OF EQUITY POSffiONS ON THE CONTROL OF THE
PARTNERS

In this section we assume that the venturers are seriously considering an equity investment arrangement, whether unilaterally or
bilaterally, to supplement their joint venture agreement. Put into
practice, such investments raise concerns from the perspective of
both the investee and the investing company. Some of the more
significant of these concerns are discussed below. The discussion
is broken into two sections: (1) Corporate governance and future
operations issues; and (2) Fiduciary duty issues.

11o

See supra text accompanying note 33.
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The Impact of Equity Investments on Corporate Governance
Issues and on Future Operations
Issues for the Investee

•
Governance: Equity arrangements can impact the investee company's internal management and control. Obviously, the larger the equity stake involved, the larger the degree of control the investing party would wield over the internal operations of the investee company. Consequently, the
investee company will likely be concerned about its continued autonomy.
•
Acquisition: By some estimates, up to 75% of joint
ventures ultimately conclude with one party acquiring the
other. Ill Since joint ventures are often a prelude to acquisition, the investee may wish to prevent the investing party
from seeking to attempt a future purchase without the approval of the investment board. This can be particularly true
in the case of joint ventures with an equity investment component since the investing party will have certain advantages
over potential third-party acquirers in light of its equity position (i.e. lower average cost).

2.

Issues for the Investor
•
Equity accounting: In joint ventures with a substantial
equity investment component, the investing party may be required to use the "equity method" of accounting (the "equity
method"). The equity method would require the investor to
report its share of the investee's earnings as incurred, rather
than as received in the form of dividends.

In Opinion No. 18, entitled The Equity Method of Accounting
for Investments in Common Stock, the Accounting Principles
Board (APB) concluded that Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) require an investor to use the equity method when
the investor's equity stake permits the company to "exercise significant influence over operating and financial policies of an inves-

111

Joel Bleeke & David Ernst, The Way to Win in Cross-Border Alliances, in COLLABO(Joel Bleeke & David Ernst eds., 1993).
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tee even though the investor holds 50% or less of the voting
stock." 112
APB Opinion No. 18 highlights several factors which would
amount to "significant influence," including representation on the
investee's board of directors, participation in its policy-making
process, material intercompany transactions, and the interchange
of managerial personnel or technological dependency.
Furthermore, the ability to exercise "significant influence" is
presumed to exist in investments of 20% or more and is presumed
not to exist for investments of less than 20%. m
If a joint venture agreement affords the investor an equity investment component greater than a 20% interest in the investee,
the presumption that the investor would exercise "significant influence" (thus, triggering the application of equity accounting
principles) can be overcome only by "facts and circumstances"
which indicate the contrary, including evidence that the investor
and investee entered into an agreement under which the investor
surrendered significant rights as a shareholder. 114
•
Control: The investing company may wish to restrict
the ability of the investee to sell a substantial equity stake to
a third party or, particularly, a competitor. At the least, the
investing party may wish to retain the ability to withdraw its
investment in the event of a change in control of the in vestee.
•
Ability to compete for control: The investing party
may also want to retain the ability to compete for control of
the in vestee if the in vestee were to decide in the future to sell.
•
Commitment of resources: Finally, the investing party
may not want to tie up scarce economic resources in the other
party for a prolonged period of time.

In joint venture transactions with an equity component, the
parties will often address these concerns through an investment
agreement of one form of another. Investment agreements often
contain one or more of the following provisions:

112
The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common Stock, lO Opinions of
the Accounting Principles Board 347, 355 (1971).
113 See id.
114
See FiNANCIAL ACCOUNT£NG STANDARDS BOARD, FASB INTERPRETATION No. 35
[CRITERIA FOR APPLYING THE EQUITY METHOD OF ACCOUNT£NG FOR INVESTMENTS £N COMMON STOCK: AN INTERPRETATION OF APB 0P£NION No. 18]1 (1981).
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•
Governance provisions that place restrictions on voting rights and/or nomination of board members. On the other
hand, the investing party may require certain concessions, including veto rights;
•

A registration rights agreement between the parties;

•
A standstill restriction which prevents the investing
party from: (1) purchasing an additional equity stake in the
investee company; (2) proposing or seeking to effect a
merger, acquisition, or similar transaction of the investee
company, announcing an intention to do so, or assisting a
third party in doing so; or (3) soliciting proxies, making
shareholder proposals, or entering into voting trusts. The investing party may require that these standstill restrictions be
lifted in the event of a proposed merger or acquisition initiated by the investee company or by a third party, or any
change of control event; and
•
A restriction on the investing party's ability to dispose
of its equity stake for a period of time, while allowing the investing party to sell in the event of a change of control or
other triggering event.
3.

Length ofTime

Time limits on governance limitations and standstill arrangements are often an important subject of negotiations between parties to an equity investment agreement. Research indicates that
such restrictions can range in length from a few years to perpetuity .115 One important factor in negotiating the expiration of these
restrictions is the duration of the joint venture. What are the implications on the investee if the restrictions lapse while the joint
venture continues? Conversely, what are the justifications, if any,
for the restrictions to continue after the joint venture has terminated?
Take, for example, Borden, Inc.'s $360 million, 39% equity
investment in AEP Industries undertaken in connection with the

115
Meryl S. Rosenblatt, Letters of Intent and Exclusivity, Confidentiality and Standstill
Agreements, in DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS 95, 120, 1349 (Practicing Law lnstitute
2002) ("Standstills entered into in the context of a friendly negotiated acquisition transaction can
tYPically last from 1 to 5 years.").
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sale of its packaging business to AEP. 116 The parties' agreement
restricted Borden's ability to purchase additional securities absent
a sale of AEP's entire voting interest to a third party. The standstill
agreement between AEP and Borden had a length of three years
unless AEP reduced its ownership stake to 0%. In addition, the
agreement between Borden and AEP called for Borden to designate four of the ten directors on the AEP board, with a fifth director to be designated jointly by the two companies. 117
On the other end of the spectrum, consider the 23.4% equity
stake in Martin Marietta Corporation received by General Electric
Company in 1993 as part of Martin Marietta's acquisition of GE
Aerospace. " 8 The companies negotiated an agreement whereby
GE acquired two seats on the Martin Marietta board. The agreement prohibits GE from acquiring any additional stock and requires GE to vote its stock in Martin Marietta according to the
wishes of the Martin Marietta board slate or, in limited circumstances, in proportion with other shareholders. The agreement between GE and Martin Marietta lasts in perpetuity, unless and until
GE were to reduce its ownership stake to less than 5%.

4.

Impact on Future Operations

Joint venture arrangements, especially where they contain an
equity investment, have the potential to substantially affect the
future business options of one or both parties.
Joint venture agreements have the potential to deter future
bidders for the investee company in several ways:" 9

116 In 1996, Borden, Inc. sold its packaging unit for approximately $360 million in cash
and stock to AEP Industries. See Ron Carter, Borden Selling Packaging Unit for $360 Million,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 21, 1996, at 1C.
117 ld.
118 Martin Marietta acquired GE Aerospace in 1993 in a deal worth $3.05 billion. In exchange for GE Aerospace, GE received approximately $2 billion in cash and receivables and the
remainder in preferred convertible stock. See Judith Gaines, Pittsfield Peers Beyond GE Embrace, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 6, 1992, at 1. Martin Marietta Corporation is now Lockheed Martin.
119 For an interesting example of an agreement whose effect is to deter future bidders, see
Peter Landers, Merck Sacrificed Right to Make Buyout Offer to Schering-Plough, WALL ST. J.,
Oc., 22, 2002, at B3. In May of 2000, Merck and Schering-Plough created a joint venture to
cooperate in developing and marketing a new anti-cholesterol drug called Zetia. The parties
expected that, if successful, Zelia would create sales that ranged in the billions. In connection
with the joint venture agreement, Merck & Co. has given up the right to make a buyout offer for
Schering-Plough unless specifically requested in writing by Schering-Plough 's board of directors. If, however, Schering-Plough's board entertains offers from a third company, Merck has
the right to make an offer of its own. Furthermore, Merck can take full control of ScheringPlough's half of the Zetia joint venture if a third company buys Schering-Plough. This last
provision seems to significantly reduce the chance that any third company would make a buyout
offer.
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•
First, a bidder might have a difficult time vaJuing the
"open-ended" nature of the joint venture relationship.
e
AdditionaJly, a bidder's vaJuation of a venturing party
could vary significantly depending upon whether its partner
would be willing to continue venture operations and/or or exercise its "exit" rights.

•
If the venture arrangement contains a significant cross
equity component, the investor's equity stake would give it a
financial advantage over other bidders for the investee (i.e.
lower average cost). Bidders might be unwilling to act as a
"stalking horse" for the investing company with no upside
potential.
•
In another variation of the "stalking horse" theme, some
joint venture investment agreements give the investing party
"notice" and "full and fair opportunity to bid" rights.

•
FinaJly, the joint venture could give one of the venturers actual or perceived informationaJ advantages over other
bidders. This is particularly true if, as is often the case, the
investor has representatives on the board of the investee.
In addition, joint venture agreements can provide one or both
companies with a potential defensive response to a future unsolicited bid. To the extent that the discounted future value of the joint
venture could not be realized because the other party to the joint
venture has favorable buy-out rights if there is a change of control,
the board could determine that a bid is inadequate and that it is in
the best interests of the Company to remain independent since, absent a change of control, the value of the company would be
greater. Moreover, these arrangements can deprive shareholders of
a fully-priced bid for their company.
Moreover, the universe of potential buyers could be reduced
by the "deterrent" aspects of joint venture agreements mentioned
above. 120
However, a joint venture can be structured so as to provide
certain advantages in the event of a future decision to sell by preserving or improving the selling company's ability to maximize
shareholder value. For example, in a joint venture with a substantial equity investment, the investing party can ensure that its stand120

See id.
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still agreement would remain in effect if the investing company
were to lose in the auction process, thus prohibiting the investing
company from soliciting against the winning bid (sometimes called
an "end run").
Finally, investment agreements often contain voting restrictions which require the investing company to vote its shares in favor of the investee board's slate. This could be of significant
value in the event of a future proxy contest.

B.

The Impact of Joint Venture Agreements and Equity Investments
on Fiduciary Obligations

As previously discussed, a joint venture agreement can result
121
In addition, the structure
in complex issues of fiduciary duties.
of a joint venture arrangement, with or without a collateral equity
investment, can have a more substantial impact on the fiduciary
obligations of one or both of the joint venture partners if the joint
venture agreements, taken as a whole, might be viewed as either:
(1) a sale of control of one of the venturers; or (2) a defense
against takeover by one of the venturers.

I.

Overview of Fiduciary Obligations

In the performance of their corporate responsibilities, corporate directors have an obligation to exercise the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances.
This is generally called the "duty of care." 122 In addition, directors
are bound by a "duty of loyalty," which prohibits corporate officers from using their position of trust and confidence to further
.
.
t 123
pnvate
mteres
s.
When reviewing whether a board of directors' approval of a
given transaction satisfies the "duty of care" and the "duty of loyalty" requirements, courts will generally apply the "business
judgment rule," a presumption that the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. 124 If

See supra pages 10-13 and accompanying footnotes.
See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (adopting
the "prudent man" standard in the duty of care context); see also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace
Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); supra note 48.
123 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503,510 (Del. 1939); see also supra notes 60-62.
124 For an early formulation of the "business judgment rule" see Bodell v. General Gas &
Electric Corp., 140 A. 264, 268 (Del. 1927) (holding that the presumption applies where "the
acts of the directors objected to were performed in good faith, in the exercise of their best judgment, and for what they believed to be the advantage of the corporation and all its stockholders."); see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (holding that the
121

122
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this presumption applies, corporate decision-makers would be
shielded from judicial second-guessing.

2.

Sale of Control

If a joint venture transaction (or the equity investment component) would be viewed as a sale of fundamental control over one
of the parties, the courts could apply a special fiduciary duty
analysis upon the company's board of directors. According to the
Delaware Supreme Court in Rev/on Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., if a "sale" or "break-up" of a company becomes
"inevitable," the duty of the board of directors changes "from the
preservation of [the corporation] as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders'
benefit," thus requiring the board to act as "auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders." 125 In such circumstances, the members of the board have to perform their duties
with a single objective in mind: the maximization of shareholder
value. 126 In order to ascertain whether board members have complied with their "duty to auction," Delaware courts apply a more
.
127
searchmg scrutmy.
Decisions since Rev/on have extended this "auction duty" beyond the factual context of the "sale" or "break-up." For instance,
the Delaware Supreme Court held in Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. 128 that "the directors' obligation to seek
the best value reasonably available for the stockholders" applies
whenever there is "a pending sale of control, regardless of whether
or not there would be a break-up of the corporation." 129 Surveying
0

"intrinsic fairness" test and not the business judgment rule should apply in the context of a parent-subsidiary relationship).
125 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (enjoining enforcement of an asset lock-up option, a noshop provision, and a beak-up fee granted to favor a favored bidder).
126 It is important to note that Rev/on dbes not impose a new type of duty upon the board
members, but rather requires them to perform their duties with a sole objective in mind- maximization of shareholder value. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001)
("In our view, Rev/on neither creates a new type of fiduciary duty in the sale-of-control context
nor alters the nature of the fiduciary duties that generally apply. Rather, Rev/on emphasizes that
the board must perform its fiduciary duties in the service of a specific objective: maximizing the
sale price of the enterprise."); see also Paramount Comm., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) ("The directors' fiduciary duties in a sale of control context are those
which generally attach. In short, 'the directors must act in accordance with their fundamental
duties of care and loyalty."') (citation omitted); id. at 44 ("In the sale of control context, the
directors must focus on one primary objective - to secure the transaction offering the best value
reasonably available for the stockholders- and they must exercise their fiduciary duties to further that end.").
127 Ma/piede, 780 A.2d at 1084 ("[T]he Revlon doctrine imposes enhanced judicial scrutiny of certain transactions involving a sale of control.").
128
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
129 /d. at 46.
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decisions since Revlon, the court noted that "the general principles
announced in Revlon" govern "every case in which a fundamental
change of corporate control occurs or is contemplated," and that
"in a sale of corporate control the responsibility of directors is to
get the highest value reasonably attainable for the shareholders. " 130
The answer to the question of whether a given transaction
would constitute "a fundamental change of corporate control" is a
highly fact-specific inquiry, and "the answer must be sought in the
specific circumstances surrounding the transaction." 131
In holding that the transfer of a majority of stock from public
shareholders to a controlling shareholder triggered the duty to
maximize shareholder value under the Rev/on case, the QVC court
found particularly significant the fact that a majority of Paramount's voting stock would transfer from "fluid aggregation of
unaffiliated stockholders" to a single "controlling stockholder"
who would have the power to (a) elect directors; (b) cause a breakup of the corporation; (c) merge it with another company; (d) cashout the public stockholders; (e) amend the certificate of incorporation; (f) sell all or substantially all of the corporate assets; or (g)
otherwise alter materially the nature of the corporation and the
public stockholders' interests. 132
The significance of the Rev/on case and its progeny is simply
that joint venture arrangements, with or without an ancillary equity
investment agreement, have the potential to trigger the "duty to
auction" if one or more of the factors outlined in the QVC case
would result from the transaction. In order to prevent courts from
second-guessing a company's decision to enter into a joint venture
with a substantial equity investment, the board of directors of the
investee company may wish to consider negotiating a standstill
arrangement which would do one or more of the following:
•
Place a cap on the investing party's ownership level
and/or its ability to increase its voting power through other
means;
•
Place voting restrictions on the investing party's equity
share;
•
Limit the ability of the investing party to transfer its
shares in large blocks to any single third party; or
130
131
132

/d.
/d. (citations omitted).
/d. at 46-48.
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•
Limit the ability of the investing party to elect a majority of the board of directors.
Since there is no "magic bullet" answer to the question of
"what constitutes a change in control," in order to get the benefit
of the business judgment rule, the investee company must consider
its fiduciary obligations thoroughly.
An effective standstilJ arrangement can eliminate many of the
fiduciary risks associated with cross equity investments. However,
there is still an open question as to how large an equity stake
would be sufficient to effect a change in control even with a standstill agreement. What if the investor were to acquire a fifty-one
percent interest in the investee? How long would the standstill
have to last in this situation? What terms must the standstill contain?
The answer to these questions is uncertain, but the guiding
principle would be that if, after the investment, the shareholders of
the investee would be able to get a full takeover premium for their
shares, a Revlon event probably has not have occurred. 133

3.

Defensive Response to a Takeover Threat

If a joint venture agreement, or its equity investment component, is deemed to be a defensive maneuver of the type described
in Unocal and its progeny, for the board to be protected by the
business judgment rule, the board's actions must survive what the
Delaware courts call "enhanced review." To satisfy the first prong
of the Unocal review and show that a potential unsolicited takeover bid would be inimical to corporate effectiveness andpolicy, it
is enough that the board establish that it acted in good faith and

Ill See, e.g., In re Unitrin, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 1994 De. Ch. LEXIS 187, at *15,
1994 WL 698483 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13. 1994), rev'd on other ground sub nom., Unitrin, Inc. v.
American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) In the context of a stock repurchase program
initiated by certain stockholder directors in response to a takeover threat, that the stock repurchase program was reviewable under Unoca/ and did not trigger Rev/on scrutiny:
Unitrin's stockholder directors will have none of these powers [enunciated by the QVC court] - they will only acquire the ability to block a
merger with another company. The stockholder directors will acquire
control over the decision whether to sell Unitrin, but the public stockholders will still receive their control premium if those directors decide
to sell. The transfer of the decision whether to sell the corporation to the
stockholder directors in response to American General's offer is a defensive action that must be evaluated under Unocal, not a transfer of control
that requires the directors to maximize short term stockholder value in
accordance with Rev/on.
!d. (emphasis added).
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upon reasonable investigation. 134 To satisfy the second prong of
the Unocal review, the proportionality test, the board must establish that the challenged transaction is "not Draconian" in nature. 135
The term "not Draconian" was later explained as referring to a
measure that is "not either coercive or preclusive. " 136 If the measure is "not Draconian," then the Unocal proportionality test guides
the enhanced judicial scrutiny towards the "the range of reasonableness."137
Prominent commentators have noted that, as applied, the
Unocal enhanced scrutiny is merely a "dressed up" business judgment review. For instance, Professors Gilson and Black see Unocal review as "primarily a formal, rhetorical instruction rather than
a substantive standard of review." 138 The Delaware Supreme Court
itself seems to have endorsed this view. The Court's analysis in
Unitrin Inc., v. American General Corp. suggests strongly that
"Draconian" measures are only those of extreme nature. The
Court itself emphasized its careful choice of words, and defined
"Draconian" literally, as:
Of or pert. to Draco, an archon and member of the Athenian
eupatridae, or the code of laws which is said to have been
framed about 621 B.C. by him as thesmothete. In them the
penalty for most offenses was death, and to a later age they
seemed so severe that they were said to be written in blood.
Hence, barbarously severe; harsh; cruel. 139
Delaware law would suggest that joint venture agreements,
where undertaken with an expectation of profit and as a means of
leveling risks, would survive Unocal review. Furthermore, as the
134 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (citation omitted); see also Aquila, Inc. v. Quanta Services, Inc., 805 A.2d 196, 206 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("[T]he first element of the Unocal test is satisfied by evidence of the directors' good faith and reasonable investigation. Here, where a majority of the members of the Special Committee that authorized the [defensive maneuver] are outside, independent directors, such evidence of good faith and reasonable investigation is 'materially enhanced."').
135 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 ("As we have noted, [the board's] duty of care extends to
protecting the corporation and its owners from perceived harm whether a threat originates from
third parties of other shareholders. But such powers are not absolute. A corporation does not
have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any Draconian means available.").
136 Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387-88.
A measure is not coercive where it is not aimed at
"cramming down" on shareholders a management-sponsored alternative. Paramount Comm.,
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55 (Del. 1989). A measure is not preclusive where it
does not strip the "stockholders of their rights to receive tender offers" and did not "fundamentally restrict proxy contests." Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985).
137 Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388 (citing Paramount Comm., Inc., 637 A.2d at 45-46).
13 8 RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARDS. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPOMTE
ACQUISITIONS 849 (David L. Shapiro eta!. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
139 Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1383-84 n.34 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 780 (2d ed. 1951)) (emphasis added).
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foregoing pages establish, because ancillary equity investments are
sometimes essential to the success of the venture, it is likely that
they will survive Unocal review as well, ·especially where some
safeguards described in this Article are considered or adopted.
Nonetheless, the board of directors of the investee company
should take adequate steps, and ensure that it understands all the
terms of the agreement, especially the implications the venture and
investment will have on the potential takeover premium that may
become available to shareholders of the company.
CONCLUSION

As this Article demonstrates, joint ventures are complex vehicles which present challenges for the venturing parties, as well as
public policy issues. When structuring a joint venture transaction,
the parties should pay particular attention to the strategic purposes
underlying the decision to employ a joint venture, rather than some
other vehicle. In addition, the parties should focus upon the impact a particular structure or particular contractual provisions
could have not only on the governance and control of the venture
itself, but, perhaps more importantly, upon the governance and
control of the venturing parties.

